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 NO NET LOSS AND FOREST OFFSETS 
IN THE FLEMISH REGION 
 A Cautionary Tale of How Not to Reconcile 
Science-Based Conservation Policies 
with Economic Interests and Vested Rights ? 
 Hendrik  Schoukens and  Geert Van  Hoorick 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Notwithstanding the widespread conservation eff orts throughout recent 
decades, the world is currently witnessing an unprecedented decline of the 
remaining biodiversity, which some authors now equate to a  “ sixth extinction 
wave ” . 1 In spite of its progressive environmental legislation, such as the EU 
Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC) 2 and Birds Directive (2009/147/EC) 3 (the 
 “ Nature Directives ” ), the EU is no exception to the general rule of continuing 
biodiversity decline, with a major share of the EU ’ s protected species and 
habitats currently under an unfavourable conservation status. 4 Even common 
or  “ ordinary ” biodiversity is not faring better in many Member States, 5 whilst 
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 6  European Environment Agency , Landscape fragmentation in the EU, 2011, Joint EEA FOEN 
Report, EEA Report , No. 2/2011, 2011. 
 7  European Commission , Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Our 
life insurance, our natural capital: an EU biodiversity strategy to 2020, COM(2011) 244 fi nal 
(hereinaft er further referred to as the EU Biodiversity Strategy). 
 8  More extensively on this ecological restoration objective, see:  A  Cliquet ,  K.  Decleer  & 
 H.  Schoukens ,  Restoring nature in the EU: Th e only way is up ? , in  C.H.  Born et al. (eds.), 
 Th e Habitats Directive in its EU Environmental Law Context: European Nature ’ s Best Hope ? , 
 Routledge ,  2015 , pp. 265 – 284. 
 9  For more information on the European Commission ’ s policy towards no net loss (NNL), see: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/nnl/index_en.htm . 
 10  Council Conclusions, No. 11249/11, 21 June 2011,  http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/
document/ST-11249-2011-INIT/en/pdf . 
 11  Council Conclusions, No. 18374/11, 19 December 2011, footnote 12,  http://data.consilium.
europa.eu/doc/document/ST-18374-2011-INIT/en/pdf . 
 12  See for instance:  Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP), in collaboration with VU, 
IVM, Eft ec and GHK , Policy Options for an EU No Net Loss Initiative, 2014. 
 13  Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 
establishing a framework for Community action in the fi eld of water policy, OJ  2000  L 371/1 
(further referred to as the Water Framework Directive). 
landscape fragmentation is continuing to unabatedly aff ect a large share of 
the EU ’ s territory. 6 In 2010, the EU established the overarching objective of 
halting the loss of biodiversity and the degradation of ecosystem services by 
2020, and of restoring 15 per cent of the degraded ecosystems wherever feasible. 7 
In order to limit further loss and to achieve its progressive restoration pledges, 8 
there is a broad consensus that further biodiversity loss needs to be avoided or, 
at the very minimum, compensated. Th e same year, the European Commission 
made a commitment to propose an initiative to ensure that there is no net loss 
(NNL) of ecosystems and their services (e.g. through compensation or off setting 
schemes). 9 To that end, the Environment Council of Ministers explicitly 
stated in its conclusions of 21 June 2011 that  “ a common approach is needed 
for the implementation in the EU of the  ‘ no net loss ’ principle ” , inviting the 
Commission to draw on the experience and specifi cities of each Member State. 10 
It was further clarifi ed that within this context, the NNL principle entails  “ that 
conservation/biodiversity losses in one geographically or otherwise defi ned area 
are balanced by a gain elsewhere, provided that this principle does not entail 
any impairment of existing biodiversity as protected by EU nature legislation. ” 11 
 Although the European Commission has presented several studies on the 
further operationalisation of NNL 12 in recent years, no explicit set of binding 
EU rules currently exists to comprehensively address NNL outside the specifi c 
context of biodiversity, which is already explicitly protected under the EU 
Nature Directives, or, to a certain extent, the water bodies covered by the Water 
Framework Directive (2000/60/EC). 13 Nor has any other policy instrument been 
adopted to lay down a more comprehensive approach to NNL. 
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 14  Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 
on the assessment of the eff ects of certain public and private projects on the environment, 
OJ  2011  L 26/1 (hereinaft er referred to as the EIA Directive). 
 15  Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the eff ects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment, OJ  2014  L 124/1 . 
 16  See for instance Recital 10 of the preamble to Directive 2014/52/EU. 
 17  See also:  H.T.  Anker ,  Simplifying EU environmental legislation  – Reviewing the EIA 
Directive ? ,  Journal for European Environmental  & Planning Law  2014 , pp. 338 – 339. 
 18  R.  Lapeyre et al .,  Biodiversity Off sets as Market-Based Instruments for Ecosystem Services ? 
From Discourse to Practices ,  Ecosystem Services  2015 , pp. 125 – 133. 
 19  Article  6(4) of the Habitats Directive stipulates that planning authorities need to require 
additional compensation measures when granting permits for large-scale projects which 
are eligible to qualify as  “ Imperative Reasons of Overriding Public Interest ” (IROPI). See 
more extensively:  D.  McGillivray ,  Compensating Biodiversity Loss: Th e EU Commission ’ s 
Approach to Compensation under Art 6 of the Habitats Directive ,  Journal of Environmental 
Law  2012 , pp. 417 – 450. 
 20  W.  Wende et al .,  Introduction of a European Strategy on No Net Loss of Biodiversity , in 
 W.  Wende et al. (eds.),  Biodiversity Off sets. European Perspectives on No Net Loss of 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services ,  Springer ,  2017 , pp. 5 – 6. 
 So far, the closest the EU has come to introducing a more robust mitigation 
and off setting scheme aimed at addressing general biodiversity loss was the 
2014 revision of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive 
(2011/92/EU), 14 which as of 2017, explicitly requires authorities to consider 
measures to avoid, prevent, reduce and, if possible, off set signifi cant eff ects on 
the environment when authorising projects are subject to a prior EIA. 15 Yet, 
while the revised EIA Directive explicitly referred to the EU ’ s NNL commitments 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity as a source of inspiration, 16 it 
remains dubious at best to read into the new provisions a substantive duty to 
fully off set the damage to nature. 17 
 Th e absence of a detailed regulatory framework at the EU level requiring 
compensation for the loss of  “ ordinary ” biodiversity notwithstanding, the 
notion of biodiversity off sets for future damage to nature has generated much 
appeal in the business, government, fi nance and conservation sectors in recent 
decades. 18 Over the past two decades, achieving NNL through biodiversity 
off setting has gradually turned into one of the overarching objectives of 
many conservation policies, at both the international and the domestic levels. 
Whereas biodiversity compensation actions have garnered a lot of attention 
in the specifi c context of protected areas, such as the Natura 2000 Network, 19 
a shift  in focus is noticeable, with many stakeholders expressing a wish that 
biodiversity off sets be directed towards the mitigation and compensation 
of habitat loss and other impacts on  “ normal ” landscapes or  “ ordinary ” 
biodiversity. 20 Member States like Germany, which introduced an Impact 
Mitigation Regulation back in 1976 under the Federal Conservation Act, 
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 21  For an analysis of the German off setting scheme, see:  M.  Reese ,  Habitat off set and 
banking  – will it save our nature ? , in  C.H.  Born et al. (eds.),  Th e Habitats Directive in its EU 
Environmental Law Context: European Nature ’ s Best Hope ? ,  Routledge ,  2015 , pp. 483 – 498. 
 22  BBOP (Business and Biodiversity Off sets Programme) , Standards on Biodiversity Off sets, 
Washington DC, 2012. 
 23  K.  ten Kate  &  M.  Crowe ,  Biodiversity Off sets: Policy Options for Governments. An Input 
Paper for the IUCN Technical Study Group on Biodiversity Off sets ,  Switzerland ,  2014 , p.  7 . 
 24  K.  ten Kate et al. ,  Biodiversity Off sets: Views, Experience, and the Business Case ,  IUCN, 
Insight Investment ,  2014 , p.  13 . 
 25  Although contested by some, even the improved protection of existing habitats against future 
degradation, better known as  “ compensated or averted loss ” , is sometimes brought under the 
umbrella of NNL. See for instance the defi nition of  “ biodiversity off sets ” used by Maron et al. 
in  M.  Maron et al. ,  Faustian bargains ? Restoration realities in the context of biodiversity off set 
policies ,  Biological Conservation  2012 , p.  142 . Very critical in this respect is:  J.W.  Bull et al ., 
 Biodiversity off sets in theory and practice ,  Oryx ,  2013 , pp. 369 – 380. 
 26  Th e European Commission has also issued several studies on the topic of  “ habitat banking ” . 
Th ese studies can be consulted at the:  http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/taxation/
index.htm#hab_bank . 
 27  For an overview of the distinct types of biodiversity banks, see:  G.  Froger et al .,  Towards 
a Comparative and Critical Analysis of Biodiversity Banks ,  Ecosystem Services  2015 , 
pp. 152 – 161. 
 28  For an overview, see:  M.  Caroll et al. (eds.),  Conservation  & Biodiversity Banking .  A Guide to 
Setting Up and Running Biodiversity Credit Systems ,  2008 . 
have extensive experience when it comes to mitigating and compensating for 
general biodiversity losses. 21 
 Th e Business and Biodiversity Programme (BBOP) currently defi nes 
the concept of  “ biodiversity off set ” as  “ measurable conservation outcomes 
resulting from actions designed to compensate for signifi cant residual adverse 
biodiversity impacts arising from project development aft er appropriate 
prevention and mitigation measures have been taken. ” 22 While no fi xed legal 
defi nition of the latter notion exists, conventional wisdom has accepted that 
biodiversity off setting is to be applied in the context of the so-called mitigation 
hierarchy. 23 Th e overall goal of biodiversity off setting is to achieve NNL or 
preferably a net gain of biodiversity in the fi eld. 24 Th ese gains are primarily to 
be achieved through the creation of new habitats or the restoration of damaged 
habitats. 25 
 In recent years, however, more market-based approaches to biodiversity 
mitigation and off setting have gained traction among politicians and business 
people. 26 Sophisticated economic regimes of biodiversity off setting  – such as 
habitat banking, bio-banking and wetland mitigation banking  – have been 
implemented in countries such as the USA, Germany and Australia. 27 Th ese 
banking approaches assume the creation of a regulated market in which 
credits from actions with benefi cial biodiversity outcomes can be purchased 
to off set the debit from environmental damage. 28 When compared with  ad hoc 
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 29  See also:  V.  Dupont et al .,  Belgium , in  W.  Wende et al. (eds.),  Biodiversity Off sets. European 
Perspectives on No Net Loss of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services ,  Springer ,  2017 , 
pp. 55 – 89. 
 30  European Environment Agency ,  Urban sprawl in Europe :  the ignored challenge ,  2006 . 
 31  V.  Van Eetvelde  &  M.  Antrop ,  Th e signifi cance of landscape relic zones in relation to soil 
conditions ,  settlement pattern and territories in Flanders, Landscape and Urban Planning 
 2005 (70), pp. 614 – 622. 
 32  T.  Verbeek  &  B.  Tempels ,  Measuring fragmentation of open space in urbanised Flanders: 
an evaluation of four methods ,  Revue belge de g é ographie  2016 (2),  https://belgeo.revues.
org/17164 . 
 33  Elke dag verdwijnt 6 hectare open ruimte, DeRedactie.be, 28 July 2014. 
 34  For more information, see:  https://www.inbo.be/nl/natuurindicator/de-staat-van-instand
houding-van-de-habitattypen-van-de-habitatrichtlijn . For more background and analysis 
with respect to the policy causes behind this limited forest cover, see:  P.  Van Gossum et al ., 
 Implementation failure of the forest expansion policy in Flanders (Northern Belgium) 
 and the policy leaning potential, Forest Policy and Economics  2008 , pp. 515 – 522;  P.  Van 
Gossum et al ., New environmental policy instruments to realise forest expansion in Flanders 
(northern Belgium):  A base for smart regulation ? ,  Land Use Policy  2009 (26), pp. 935 – 946. 
compensation implemented by permittees, market-based approaches to 
off setting are believed to lead to more cost-eff ective nature conservation 
strategies, capable of off ering both additional fl exibility and less administrative 
burdens for project developers whilst generating more robust biodiversity 
gains. 
 It needs little consideration to understand that the concrete implementation 
of biodiversity off sets requires planning authorities to perform complex 
balancing exercises, in which vested property rights and land-use plans need to 
be aligned and balanced with emerging, science-based recovery policies. Th e 
region of Flanders represents an interesting case study to analyse the multitude 
of obstacles that need to be addressed in order to operationalise a performant 
compensation scheme. 29 Th e reasons therefore are twofold. Firstly, the need for 
proactive biodiversity compensation schemes in the Flemish region is beyond 
dispute. Flanders is one of the most densely populated regions of Europe, with 
around 470 inhabitants per square kilometre. 30 Nearly a quarter of the Flemish 
region is urbanised and about half of its surface is occupied by agriculture. 
By the same token, Flanders is oft en tagged as  “ one big city ” , 31 with growing 
residential areas and a patchwork of open space fragments in between. 32 In spite 
of recent policy eff orts to halt further fragmentation, six hectares of  “ open space ” 
in Flanders are still lost every day. 33 
 Secondly, the environmental track record of the Flemish region is far from 
satisfactory, with the area managed in view of biodiversity targets confi ned 
to a mere 6 per cent of the total surface area, and the majority of the habitats 
and species listed in the EU Habitats Directive under an unfavourable 
conservation status. 34 A recent area of concern is the limited forest cover. 
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 35  For an overview, see:  H.  Schoukens et al. ,  Handboek natuurbehoudsrecht ,  Kluwer ,  2011 , 
pp. 470 – 500. 
 36  See for instance:  M.  Moreno-Mateos et al. ,  Th e true loss caused by biodiversity off sets , 
 Biological Conservation  2015 , pp. 552 – 559;  M.  Curran et al .,  Is there any empirical support 
for biodiversity off set policy ? ,  Ecological Applications  2014 , pp. 628 – 630. 
In comparison with other EU Member States, only a relatively modest area of 
Flanders is covered by forests. Around 160,000 hectares are covered in trees, 
which represents 11  per  cent of the total surface area. Most of these forests 
(70 per cent) are held in private hands. A signifi cant portion of these forests 
(approximately 40 per cent) are moreover situated in areas that have not been 
allocated a green designation on the applicable land-use plans. In addition, 
while there exists a legal prohibition  – called a  “ moratorium ”  – on deforestation 
since 1996, in combination with a compensation duty, the forest cover continues 
to decline at an average rate of 200 hectares every year. 35 
 Th e recent Flemish experiences with biodiversity off sets for deforestation 
are indicative of the many critical analyses that have recently been published in 
the scientifi c literature. 36 Even so, recent attempts to overcome and remedy the 
many inherent fl aws in the forest compensation rules  – such as the adoption of a 
Forest Protection Map aimed at the protection of woodlands situated in housing 
zones and industrial estates  – have not led to any substantial improvements, 
while the existing compensation mechanisms are not working eff ectively enough 
to outdo the ongoing impairments. Based upon a thorough analysis of the 
past Flemish experiences with the applicable forest compensation schemes 
over the past two decades, as well as new draft  proposals for new legislation 
and recent case law developments, this chapter tries to draw some overarching 
conclusions as to the operationalisation of off setting mechanisms targeting 
‘ordinary’ biodiversity, which is not strictly protected under EU law. It is posited 
that the Flemish lessons can also be instructive for the operationalisation of 
off setting schemes in other EU Member States. 
 2.  THE GENESIS OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON 
FOREST OFFSETTING AND NATURE PROTECTION 
 In this preliminary section, a brief overview of the Flemish protection schemes 
and their recent evolutions is presented. Th e focus is on forest protection 
and off setting. However, given the blatant lack of coherency when it comes 
to regulations aimed at nature protection, several mutually overlapping legal 
regimes apply to forests in the Flemish region and therefore need to be addressed 
in order to obtain a comprehensive overview of the applicable protection level 
for forests and woodlands in the Flemish region. 
Intersentia 505
No Net Loss and Forest Off sets in the Flemish Region 
 37  Flemish Forest Decree of 13 June 1990, Belgian Offi  cial Gazette, 28 September 1990 
(hereinaft er referred to as the Flemish Forest Decree). 
 38  Schoukens et al .,  supra , note 35 at pp. 476 – 488. 
 39  See Article 3 of the Forest Decree. 
 40  See:  https://www.natuurpunt.be/pagina/beleidsdossier-zonevreemde-bossen . 
 41  Th e applicable land-use plans are used as binding yardsticks when individual planning 
permits are granted. In principle, no activities are permissible in green zones in the applicable 
zoning plans which compromise the green character of the site. 
 2.1.  THE STEEP ROAD TOWARDS A MORATORIUM ON 
DEFORESTATION 
 It would be unfair to state that forests were unprotected before the entry 
into force of the so-called Forest Decree ( Bosdecreet ) in 1990. 37 Indeed, from 
as early as 1946 onwards, activities leading to deforestation were made subject 
to a prior planning permit. However, given the lack of substantive criteria to be 
taken into account when considering such planning applications and the fact 
that in most instances the local municipalities were the competent planning 
authorities, limited protection resulted from these planning permit schemes. 
Th is was all about to change in 1990, when the Flemish Parliament decided 
to update the old rules on forest management and codifi ed them in the Forest 
Decree. 38 In essence, this new piece of legislation aimed to protect forests, 
regardless of their location and/or ownership status. 39 Th e former element was 
important, given that from the 1970s onwards detailed land-use plans had been 
adopted  – the so-called  gewestplannen . Even when these land-use plans 
were located the majority of the most pristine forests in areas with a green 
designation  – which meant that no other damaging activities were permissible, 
with the exception of forest and nature management  – the remaining 
40  per  cent were still located in areas intended for industrial development, 
agricultural activities or housing zones pursuant to the applicable land-use 
plans. 40 
 Against this bleak backdrop, the relevance of the newly passed forest 
protection rules became evident. Whereas the presence of forests on agricultural 
lands leaves limited options for logging and deforestation, this was obviously not 
the case for trees that are located on sites which have been assigned an industrial 
or housing development designation in the applicable zoning plans. 41 In time, 
the trees present on these lands might disappear in view of other economic 
considerations. Future building plans inevitably led to the shrinking of the forest 
cover in these areas. 
 Th at said, the defi nition of the notion of  “ forest ” did not explicitly refer to 
the applicable land-use plans. Th e absence of such a reference to zoning plans 
is not without importance, seeing that it off ers a general level of protection 
to all forests, irrespective of the applicable land-use destination. Th e mere 
presence of trees  – alongside shrubs  – was deemed suffi  cient to fall within 
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 42  For more guidance in this regard, see the guidelines published on the site of the Agency for 
Nature and Forests:  https://www.natuurenbos.be/defi nitiebos . 
 43  Schoukens et al .,  supra , note 35 at p. 11. 
 44  Id. at pp. 476 – 479. 
 45  Flemish Forest Decree, Article 90bis(1). 
the scope of application of the Forest Decree. 42 Th e relatively open defi nition 
connotes a progressive application of the newly established protection schemes 
for endangered forests. Since no explicit threshold is applicable, meaning that 
even a collection of three trees alongside some shrubs can qualify as a forest, 
the protection off ered by the Forest Decree appears even more impressive at fi rst 
glance. It seemed to prioritise ecological considerations over applicable land-use 
and zoning plans, even when this might clash with the underlying economic 
interests. Th e substantive underpinnings of the Forest Decree allowed the 
competent planning authorities to apply more scrutiny, even when considering 
planning applications for relatively limited areas of forest cover. However, 
back in 1990, no explicit moratorium on deforestation was put forward in 
law, severely limiting the practical eff ect of the newly adopted protection 
schemes. Th e latter only happened in 1996, with the adoption of a new decree 
modifying the Forest Decree. In essence, the moratorium on deforestation 
entailed that as a general rule deforestation is to be considered a prohibited 
activity, with the exception of public utility works. 43 
 Even though poorly applied on the ground during the fi rst years, this 
scheme  of protection rules stood out as one of the early examples of a clear-
cut NNL instrument within the Flemish region. Judged by many as too 
stringent, however, in 1997 the Forest Decree was subsequently relaxed to 
authorise deforestation in restrictive circumstances and under strict conditions, 
requiring compensatory measures in order to maintain the forest cover in the 
Flemish region. 44 Th e permitting scheme, which was still founded on a general 
prohibition on deforestation, is now basically two-tiered. 45 If a purported case 
of deforestation takes place in industrial or urban zones (as defi ned by the 
relevant land-use plans), is linked to projects of general interest or is part of a 
nature management plan, the moratorium can be lift ed through the issuance 
of a general planning permit. In other words, such actions are exempted from 
the application  of the strict forest protection rules. In all other instances, 
deforestation  is subject to a prior derogation by the Agency for Nature and 
Forests. Only aft er having obtained this prior exemption can an application for 
a general planning permit for deforestation be considered by the competent 
planning authority. Accordingly, woodlands that are  “ out-zoned ” , i.e. located 
outside the green zones designated on the relevant land-use plans, enjoy less 
protection than woodlands that are located inside designated green zones. 
Th is is another illustration of how nature protection rules are rendered 
subordinate to the applicable zoning plans, thereby avoiding potential confl icts 
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 46  Flemish Forest Decree, Article 90bis(2). 
 47  Flemish Forest Decree, Article 90bis(4). 
 48  Belgian Court of Auditors (Rekenhof) ,  Ontbossing en compensatie. UItvoering van de 
compensatieplicht bij ontbossing en werking van het Bossencompensatirfonds ,  Verslag van 
het Rekenhof aan het Vlaams Parlement ,  2016 , p.  38 . 
 49  Flemish Forest Decree, Article 90bis(4), subpara. 2. 
 50  Flemish Forest Decree, Article 90bis(1), subpara. 3. 
 51  Flemish Regulation of 16 February 2001 relating to forest compensation and deforestation 
derogation, Belgian Offi  cial Gazette, 23 March 2001 (hereinaft er referred to as the Flemish 
Forest Regulation), Article 5. 
between ecological assessments and future development scenarios. While the 
modifi ed Forest Decree promulgated additional substantive criteria and prior 
consultation procedures to be taken into account when considering applications 
for planning permits, it still failed to get rid of the dichotomy between forest 
located in or outside  “ green zones ” on the applicable land-use plans. 
 Turning to the question of forest compensation, the following set of rules 
applies. If deforestation is allowed in accordance with the above-mentioned 
regulations, it must in principle be compensated for by the owner of the 
permit. 46   Compensation may take place  in kind , by paying an amount of 
money to a compensation fund, or by a combination of both. 47 Since 2014, the 
deforestation of areas larger than three hectares must be fully compensated 
 in kind . Only in limited circumstances  – such as the deforestation needed for 
the implementation of site-specifi c objectives for Natura 2000 sites or in a 
context of spontaneous reforestation  – is no compensation required. 
 Th e Forest Decree lays down a set of specifi c rules regarding the determination 
of adequate off sets. Likewise, additional regulation promulgates specifi c rules 
with regard to the exact implementation of the forest off sets. Interestingly, it 
establishes standardised off set ratios based on the ecological value of the 
woodland that will be destroyed through the project development. 48 Th e decree 
itself sets minimum ratios starting at 1:1, i.e. an area at least equivalent to the 
deforested area. 49 Th is ratio increases to 1:3 if the clearing approval involves 
a forest that contributes to the conservation objectives of a special area of 
conservation under the EU Habitats Directive. 50 Th e Regulations include a 
table listing the diff erent ratios applicable to each forest type. Th e total area in 
square metres that must be reforested/aff orested is then multiplied by a certain 
fi gure in order to obtain the full price. 51 Currently, this fi gure is  € 3.56 per square 
metre and it increases to  € 10.68 if the clearing approval involves a forest that 
contributes to the conservation objectives of a special area of conservation 
(SAC) under the EU Habitats Directive. 
 Th e forest compensation, whether in the form of on-the-ground off sets or 
monetary payments into the fund, must involve the reforestation/aff orestation 
of unforested land (except in rare circumstances) in certain green and public 
areas within applicable zoning plans. In principle, the payment of monetary 
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 52  Decision of the Flemish Government of 23 September 1997, Offi  cial Gazette, 21 March 
1998. Th e Flemish Spatial Structure Plan has been revised on several occasions. See more at: 
 https://rsv.ruimtevlaanderen.be/RSV/Informatie/Over-het-RSV/Downloads . 
 53  https://www.inbo.be/nl/natuurindicator/oppervlakte-afgebakend-ven . 
 54  Flemish Nature Conservation Decree of 21 October 1997, Belgian Offi  cial Gazette, 10 January 
1998 (hereinaft er referred to as the Flemish Nature Conservation Decree). 
forest compensation has to be made within four months of the issuance of the 
permit. 
 2.2.  A NEW, GREENER HORIZON WITH THE ADOPTION 
OF THE  RUIMTELIJK STRUCTUURPLAN VLAANDEREN 
BACK IN  … 1997 
 As previously mentioned, the poor articulation between the general rules on 
planning law and forest protection gave way to inadequate protection on 
the  ground. During the 1990s, a case was made for the better integration of 
nature and forest protection into the applicable planning instruments, both at the 
strategic ( structuurplannen ) as well as the executive ( ruimtelijk uitvoeringsplannen ) 
level. Th e adoption of the so-called Flemish Spatial Structure Plan ( Ruimtelijk 
Structuurplan Vlaanderen ) in 1997 was a milestone in terms of spatial planning 
management. It laid down the leading principles for spatial planning in Flanders 
based on a projection of the desired spatial structure of the Flemish region. 52 
In terms of biodiversity protection, it set some ambitious policy targets, 
including the creation of a Flemish Ecological Network ( Vlaams Ecologisch 
Netwerk ) of 125,000 hectares, which is to constitute a coherent, interconnected 
ecological network of large nature areas in which nature conservation 
and/or restoration is to be the primary management objective. Many forests 
were included in this ecological network, which, however, was never fully 
designated, and ultimately ended up protecting only approximately 92,000 
hectares. 53 Th is network of core areas, which was subsequently codifi ed 
in the Flemish Nature Conservation Decree of 21 October 1997, 54 was to 
be supported by 150,000 hectares of nature areas with mixed functions 
( natuurverwevingsgebieden ) and an undefi ned number of interconnecting 
corridor areas ( natuurverbindingsgebieden ) as well. Th ese pledges were never 
really translated into extensive protection areas on the ground. 
 In order to reverse the landscape fragmentation, the Flemish government 
pledged through the Flemish Spatial Structure Plan to designate 38,000 hectares 
of additional  “ green ” zones and 10,000 hectares of additional forest areas on 
the land-use plans by 2007. However, as will be established in the subsequent 
part of this chapter, turning these commitments into concrete action and 
results on the ground proved to be more troublesome than initially expected. 
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 55  Regulation of the Flemish Government of 23 July 1998 laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation of the Decree of 21 October 1997 concerning nature conservation and the 
natural environment, Belgian Offi  cial Gazette, 10 September 1998 (hereinaft er referred to as 
the 1998 Biotope Regulation). 
 56  Articles 13 – 18 of the German Federal Nature Protection Act. See more extensively:  P.  Fischer-
Huft le ,  35 Jahre Eingriff sregelung  – eine Bilanz,  Natur und Recht  2011 , pp. 753 – 758. 
 2.3.  OTHER PROTECTION REGIMES RELEVANT FOR FORESTS 
AND WOODLANDS 
 In addition to the general protection rules linked to woodlands, several types of 
biotope enjoy additional protection in the Flemish region. In a similar fashion 
to the Forest Decree, the 1998 Flemish Biotope Regulation now diff erentiates 
between two sets of protection schemes. Its Article 7 assigns strict protection 
to certain types of threatened biotopes in the Flemish region, such as swamps, 
semi-natural grasslands and dune habitats. 55 In limited cases, a derogation from 
this ban, which applies to the entire territory of the Flemish region and thus 
is in principle not subject to the applicable zoning plans, can be issued by the 
Agency for Nature and Forests. To a certain extent, forests may also benefi t 
from these specifi c rules on biotope protection, for instance in the case of forest 
swamps. Even when located in future housing zones, such woodlands enjoy the 
protection off ered by the 1998 Biotope Regulation. 
 Along similar lines, the Flemish Nature Conservation Decree also includes 
a set of so-called  “ horizontal protection instruments ” , loosely inspired by 
the German  Eingriff sregelung . 56 Th e instruments aim to avoid or mitigate 
net losses in the context of  “ ordinary biodiversity ” without overly impeding 
spatial developments. In many instances, these general protection instruments 
are also applicable in the context of forests. First, there is the generic due 
diligence obligation contained in Article 14 of the Nature Conservation Decree 
( natuurzorgplicht ), which sets forth a duty of care towards nature that has to 
be observed by everyone who carries out certain activities liable to damage 
biodiversity. It is not explicitly linked to planning permitting schemes and is 
permanently applicable, implying that it is also of use whenever small-scale 
interventions in forests are conducted without there being any consideration 
for valuable nature. Whereas the duty of care is to be cumulatively applied with 
tailor-made protection schemes for specifi c biotopes, their added value is most 
prominent in cases of potential destruction of  “ ordinary nature ” , which does 
not harbour habitats or species that are explicitly listed on the annexes to the 
Flemish nature conservation regulations. 
 Alongside the general duty of care, a more comprehensive mitigation 
clause, to be applied in the context of planning permitting schemes, was 
established by Article  16 of the Nature Conservation Decree. To be more 
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 62  See also:  P.  Scott ,  Appropriate Assessment: A Paper Tiger ? , in  G.  Jones QC (ed.),  Th e Habitats 
Directive  – A Developer ’ s Obstacle Course ,  Hart, 2012 , p.  103 . 
precise, the latter provision imposes the obligation on permit-issuing agencies 
to guarantee that the activities they authorise cause no  ‘ avoidable damage ’ 
to biodiversity ( natuurtoets ). Yet the concept of  “ avoidable damage ” is not 
restrictively defi ned, which implies that the clause can in principle be used 
to avoid or mitigate encroachments upon biodiversity both in the context of 
strictly protected biodiversity, such as Natura 2000 sites, and in the context of 
so-called  “ ordinary ” biodiversity. 57 Accordingly, forests are also included in 
its scope. Recent case law developments have exposed the importance of this 
provision for the protection of forests located in sites which have been assigned 
for industrial development. 58 It is important to highlight that, in theory, 
no   de minimis threshold  applies, which again underlines the broad scope of 
Article  16. 59 Moreover, various decisions of the Belgian administrative courts 
have revealed that the mitigation rule also applies when the specifi c rules on 
forest compensation have been applied. 60 
 2.4.  THE INCREASING RELEVANCE OF NATURA 2000 
FOR FORESTS 
 Th e well-known  “ fi rst pillar ” of the EU Habitats Directive requires the EU 
Member States to conserve and protect the Natura 2000 sites that have been 
designated on their respective territories. A signifi cant number of forest habitats 
are listed in Annex I to the Habitats Directive, implying that the Member 
States are required to designate a suffi  cient number of Natura 2000 sites in 
this regard. Many of the most ecologically valuable forests in Flanders are 
included in the Natura 2000 Network. When adequately enforced, Article 6(3) 
and (4) of the Habitats Directive evidently play an essential role in averting 
further net losses in the context of the national sites that have been included 
in the Natura 2000 Network. Although these specifi c conservation duties do 
not necessarily put a general ban on inherent harmful interventions in nature, 
such as deforestation, 61 their exclusive ecological focus considerably aff ects the 
leeway for planning authorities when issuing permits for potential harmful 
development in the context of a Natura 2000 site. 62 Evidently, such benefi cial 
eff ects should therefore also materialise within the Flemish context. Yet the 
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long-lasting absence of strict assessment rules in the 1997 Flemish Nature 
Conservation Decree 63 eff ectively turned the ecological network into a  “ paper 
tiger ” for more than a decade, which also left  many valuable forests virtually 
unprotected. 64 
 Apart from general regulations on nature-friendly forestry and agriculture, 
no specifi c provisions aimed at avoiding signifi cant eff ects in the context of 
Natura 2000 were eff ectively enforced throughout the 1990s. 65 Th is loophole 
has severely undermined the eff ectiveness of the forest protection regime in 
the specifi c context of Natura 2000 sites in the Flemish Region for years. Th e 
2002 landmark decision of the Belgian Council of State in a case concerning 
the construction of a new tidal dock ( Deurganckdock ) in the Antwerp port area 
served as a turning point. 66 Pressured by pending infringement proceedings, 
the Flemish Parliament decided to modify the Flemish Nature Conservation 
Decree  in 2002 67 by including a strict assessment duty for plans and projects 
liable to damage Natura 2000 sites, among other things. 
 According to Article  36-ter,  § 4 of the Flemish Nature Conservation 
Decree, which now closely resembles Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, the 
competent authorities must not agree to any plan or project which, according 
to the appropriate assessment, is likely to have a signifi cant eff ect on a Natura 
2000 site. 68 By virtue of Article 36-ter,  § 5 of the Flemish Nature Conservation 
Decree, which serves as the counterpart of Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive, 
plans or projects can still go ahead in spite of a negative assessment, provided 
that there is no alternative solution, that they are necessary for imperative 
reasons of overriding public interest (IROPI) and that all compensatory 
measures necessary to ensure the overall coherence of the Natura 2000 Network 
are taken. In recent case law, the application of these protection clauses has 
proven to be a valuable fall-back instrument for forests located in Natura 
2000 sites. 69 
 It should come as no surprise that the restoration of forest habitats  – for 
instance through the additional aff orestation of sites  – is oft en mentioned as 
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an explicit conservation action in the draft  versions of the site-specifi c Natura 
2000 management plans that are promulgated by the competent authorities. 
In some instances, however, the restoration of certain habitat types, such as 
heather or grasslands, might necessitate the conversion of less ecologically 
valuable coniferous forests into more desirable target habitats. Since 2014, the 
Flemish region has stepped up its eff orts to operationalise its management 
actions in view of the established site-specifi c conservation objectives. 
Th is also helps to explain why a Flemish conservation organisation such as 
Natuurpunt vzw can be identifi ed tagged as the largest deforester in the Flemish 
region. 70 However, in sharp contrast with other cases of deforestation, such 
actions do not lead to a net loss in terms of naturally managed areas if they 
are replaced by more valuable habitats. 71 As a result, such actions are to be 
treated diff erently when compared to deforestation aimed at the construction 
of buildings. 
 3.  ANALYSIS OF THE CONTINUED NET LOSS: 
WHY IS THE FLEMISH REGION STILL LOSING 
FOREST COVER ? 
 Even though the above-mentioned legislation is far from perfect, it could still 
serve as a useful instrument to contain forest loss. However, precisely the 
contrary has happened. In spite of the current moratorium on deforestation, 
Flanders is still losing more forests on average. Although in 2006 the forest 
cover in Flanders increased on average by 200 hectares, the Flemish Region is 
nevertheless losing 230 hectares of forest cover on a net basis every year. Th ese 
numbers are based on the so-called  Bosmonitor , published by the NGO BOS + in 
2015. 72 Th e same fi gures indicate that the area that is being aff orested amounts 
to 130 hectares per year, whereas the yearly loss of forest cover amounts to 
200 – 300 hectares every year. Even though these numbers remain contested and 
challengeable, due to an apparent lack of sound and scientifi cally validated data, 
among other reasons, 73 they still display a manifest gap between the ambitious 
policy pledges with respect to reforestation and the reality on the ground. 74 
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As recently as spring 2019, both the competent Minister for the Environment 
and a political opposition party released new fi gures on deforestation. Both 
parties agreed that during the past fi ve years, 1,200 hectares of forest had been 
destroyed,  of which 536 hectares had been directly compensated by private 
developers and property owners. Depending on whether consideration is 
given to the multiplier to be taken into account when carrying out off sets, or 
alternatively the actual surface area of the woodland destroyed, the compensation 
ratio is 72  per  cent or 82 per cent. 75 Yet these numbers do not refl ect the 
eff ectiveness of the restoration actions on the ground, since they oft en take years 
to fully materialise, as well as the cases in which no compensation duty applies 
(see  infra ,  section 3.5 ). 
 When set against surrounding regions and countries of a comparable size, 
the Flemish region continues to stand out as a well-developed region that 
nevertheless continues to falter in the operationalisation of an eff ective forest 
protection and recovery policy. 76 Th is was further highlighted in 2016, when 
the draft  Forest Map ( Boskaart ) failed to be adopted. Th is map designated all 
of the ecologically valuable forests located outside the nature and forest zones 
as included in the applicable zoning plans. It took into account certain criteria, 
such as the ecological value of each site and the surface it covers. Deforestation 
was to become exceptional in these areas, only justifi able when necessary 
for reasons of public interest. Th e owners of such lands were still entitled to 
partial fi nancial compensation, up to 80  per  cent of the economic value of 
their private lands. However, aft er major protests on the part of the aff ected 
property owners and project developers, the Flemish Minister-President 
quickly decided to withdraw the map in September 2017. Th is was done in the 
midst of a public consultation on the context of the Forest Map, since it was 
assumed that the map had been drawn up in an inaccurate and careless manner. 
Among other problems, the provisional version of the Forest Map included 
several parcels of land where in fact no woodlands were present. 77 Restricting 
property rights for the preservation of a couple of trees was the framing that 
prevailed in the media, which explains the limited political support it enjoyed 
at the end of the day. 78 Since then, no follow-up for the zoning map has been 
adopted. Th e threat of future restrictions led to a rush of planning permits 
for  “ out-zoned ” forests, thereby ironically speeding up the loss of forests. 79 
 Below, the authors present the principal causes for the continued net 
loss and try to analyse why the Flemish region is still to be regarded as a 
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net deforester. Due to the limited space available for this analysis, the discussion 
focuses only on the primary issues to be addressed, leaving other valuable 
elements open for future research. 
 3.1.  THE POOR ARTICULATION BETWEEN FOREST 
PROTECTION AND URBAN AND SPATIAL PLANNING LAW 
 A fi rst element of concern is related to the lack of proper integration between 
the Forest Decree and the rules on land-use planning. As has been demonstrated 
above, the concrete application of the deforestation moratorium is contingent 
on the precise location of the forests. Trees growing on a site which has not 
been accorded a green designation on the applicable land-use plans are 
 de facto outlawed. Th is glaring mismatch between spatial planning and nature 
protection has been the subject of continued criticism in the literature, 
especially since the quality of the applicable land-use plans oft en leaves a lot 
to be desired. 80 Many of the applicable land-use plans date from the 1980s and 
were not subject to a prior strategic environmental assessment. In other words, 
economic interests oft en prevailed when designating housing and industrial 
zones, which was the primary reason behind the  “ out-zoning ” of many forests. 
Th erefore, no precedence was given to the ecological characteristics of the sites 
concerned, at least not when this information appeared to be at odds with 
the prevailing economic views on certain location. For instance, an isolated 
forest located at the edge of an industrial estate was very likely to be included 
in an industrial expansion zone on the applicable zoning plans. Seeing that 
at the time the societal impact of environmental NGOs was rather limited 
and access to justice in environmental cases in these years remained rather 
exceptional for NGOs, not many  “ guardians ” were available to stand up for 
the provision of additional protection for forests, even when located close to 
housing zones or industrial estates. As a result, the out-zoning of the forests 
almost happened overnight, without much opposition. 
 Th is  “ chilling eff ect ” was exacerbated by the inclusion of so-called  “ spatial 
exemption ” clauses in the Nature Conservation Decree, further aimed at 
limiting the property restrictions tied to conservation schemes. Pursuant to 
these clauses, nature protection schemes need to be interpreted so as to not 
stand in the way of project developments that are in line with the established 
land-use plans. 81 Th is is yet another reassertion of the prioritisation of the 
oft en  – from an environmental point of view  – fl awed zoning plans over 
ecological considerations. 
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 Of course, the subordination of forest protection to planning law is partly 
mitigated by the wording of the Forest Decree itself, as well as the application 
of other instruments, such as the above-mentioned Article  16 of the Nature 
Conservation Decree. For instance, in a 2009 landmark ruling, the Belgian 
Council of State had to consider development options in the context of a 
site which had been designated as an  “ industrial estate ” on the applicable 
land-use plans, yet harboured a valuable patch of forest habitat. According 
to the developer, Article  16 could not be interpreted so as to limit his future 
development options, especially since he had complied with the specifi c rules 
on forest off setting. However, the Council of State reasserted the applicability 
of Article  16 of the Flemish Nature Conservation Decree to biodiversity 
located in industrial zones. 82 By doing so, the Council of State eff ectively 
underlined the importance of assessing the impact of project developments 
on ordinary biodiversity, even when located outside protected areas. 83 
Possibly, it opted for an outcome which was not in line with the original 
intentions of the draft ers of the Nature Conservation Decree. 
 Even so, the practical eff ect of this progressive case law remains limited 
at best. Article  16 of the Nature Conservation Decree cannot be cited as an 
eff ective mitigation rule for the protection of forests that are out-zoned 
pursuant to old land-use plans. It is too vaguely and loosely formulated to 
halt further losses. For instance, it does not map out the substantive criteria 
to be taken into account when considering whether nature can be destroyed 
or not. It even does not contain an explicit balancing clause. To give but one 
example of its inherent shortcomings, pursuant to other case law developments, 
Article 16 of the Nature Conservation Decree is not applicable to  “ unavoidable 
damage ” to nature. According to the Council of State, the notion of  “ avoidable 
damage ” cannot be interpreted in such a way that a permit is refused with 
reference to the unavoidable impacts on the environment caused by the 
project. 84 Add to that the limited enforcement of such protection tools by local 
municipalities and it becomes clear that forests located outside protected sites 
are  de facto  “ outlawed ” . Neither the relatively inadequate forest compensation 
mechanisms, nor the imperfect mitigation rules included in the Nature 
Conservation Decree were able to eff ectively prevent further net losses. 
 Th is being the case, the increased importance of the Natura 2000 
Network is capable of partly mitigating the fl awed articulation between 
forest protection and planning law. Pursuant to the case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), economic consideration cannot 
prevail over ecological criteria when assessing the suitability of a site in terms 
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of Natura 2000 designation  purposes. 85 Th is has led to the inclusion of some 
 “ out-zoned ” forests in Natura 2000 sites, adding to their further legal protection. 86 
However, given that Member States are not required to designate all patches 
of listed habitats on their land, yet are allowed to prioritise the most 
endangered and/or valuable ones, economic considerations can implicitly play 
a role. 
 Th us, by referring to the limited ecological potential of certain forests, which 
might be linked to past degradation, Member States can still indirectly 
exclude forests from Natura 2000 protection. 87 Th is has also materialised in the 
Flemish region, leaving many valuable forest habitats undesignated in terms 
of Natura 2000 protection. Th is, in turn, explains the recent surge in the 
number of contested cases in which  “ out-zoned ” forests are destroyed in view of 
economic developments. Placing all hope on the  “ greening ” of the existing 
land-use plans (i.e. issuing new zoning plans which assign a green destination 
to the forest habitats) might be futile, seeing that the revision of such plans 
takes years and might lead to additional compensation claims ( planschade ) 
from landowners who see their property drop in economic value. For now, it 
simply does not represent a top political priority. In many instances, the local 
municipalities will be the competent planning authorities. At present, the latter 
lack suffi  cient fi nancial backing to carry out such a major policy shift . Local 
governments are fi nanced in view of the population numbers and not in light 
of the ecological importance of the sites they harbour. Only when additional 
fi nancial support is off ered by the Flemish government for forest restoration 
will local authorities be proved willing to further green the applicable land-use 
plans, which might further bolster the protection of  “ out-zoned ” forests and 
unprotected forest habitats that possibly qualify for Natura 2000 protection. 
 3.2.  THE MITIGATION HIERARCHY IN THEORY AND 
IN PRACTICE: THE COMPLEXITY OF SAYING NO 
 Th e so-called mitigation hierarchy is frequently cited as the self-evident 
backbone  of every eff ective NNL policy. 88 Th e mitigation sequence basically 
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boils  down to a sequence of diff erent steps when assessing the damage 
incurred to biodiversity through project developments. Project developers 
should therefore fi rst focus on measures capable of avoiding negative impacts 
on protected biodiversity from the outset, such as careful spatial or temporal 
placement of infrastructure or disturbances. Th e next step requires the project 
developer to inquire whether measures can be adopted aimed at reducing or 
minimising the expected negative impact of a plan or project. Th e third tier then 
involves so-called rehabilitation measures, which should remedy unavoidable 
residual damage or loss, if possible through the on-site restoration of habitats. 
If, aft er having taken all the above-mentioned measures, some residual damage 
still has to be addressed, off set measures or compensatory measures come into 
play. 89 To put it bluntly, off sets are only to be used as a so-called  “ last resort ” , 
if all other steps of the mitigation hierarchy have been observed. 90 
 As could already have been inferred from the analysis above, the current 
legal regimes in the Flemish region for forest and nature protection do not 
comprehensively reflect this mitigation hierarchy. By providing a relatively 
strict moratorium on deforestation in forests located in green zones in 
the applicable land-use plans, the prevention principle is at least partially 
acknowledged. However, generally speaking, the above-discussed rules 
do not explicitly mandate the competent agency authorities to blatantly 
refuse authorisations for unsustainable projects that might lead to massive 
environmental degradation. Substantive criteria are not detailed in the 
legislation, opening the door for continued discretion and deference. 
Admittedly, an overly rigid application of the mitigation hierarchy might 
ultimately compromise the legitimacy of nature legislation itself, as if every 
single step of the mitigation hierarchy is to be taken to its ultimate extent, 
this might imply that no projects are to be carried out at all. Not every single 
plantation or intensively managed forest is worth rescuing; the focus should 
be placed on those forests that are important from an ecological point of view. 
Putting extensive efforts into saving plantation forests appears to be futile, if 
other cases of deforestation are not properly addressed. Moreover, a stringent 
application of the mitigation hierarchy also clashes with the paradigm of 
continued economic growth. Simply accepting a no-development scenario as 
a realistic alternative would urge authorities to reconsider their traditional 
view on economic growth. In itself that might represent an interesting 
side-effect of the latter provision. However, it should come as no surprise 
that such an outcome would require a paradigm shift in the heads of 
the permit issuing agencies. As of today, such systemic movement towards a 
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complete standstill of deforestation actions would require substantive political 
backing, which is still lacking. 
 With this being said, the available case law illustrates that even within 
the confi nes of Article  16, limited room remains available for advocating for 
a strict application of the mitigation hierarchy. Th is is irrespective of whether 
more scrutiny might be justifi ed by the presence of ecologically valuable forest 
habitats on the ground. To give but one poignant illustration, in a 2010 ruling 
on the construction of a road cutting through a site which harboured several 
patches of ecologically valuable grasslands, the Council of State further clarifi ed 
that Article 16 of the Flemish Nature Conservation Decree does not include a 
prohibition on declining permit applications for projects that inherently cause 
further damage to biodiversity. In the latter case, though, the project developer 
had included a compensation scheme in its permit application, which might 
perhaps help to explain the more liberal interpretation by the Council of State. 91 
Yet at the same time, most of the compensation actions involved in the latter 
case consisted of qualitative restoration actions in the remaining grassland 
area, whereas a substantial part of the quantitative loss of grassland was not 
compensated at all. 92 It is hard not to see in this ruling a further weakening of 
the legal teeth of Article 16 of the Nature Conservation Decree. 
 In addition, the numbers related to the concrete application of forest 
compensation illustrate that limited attention is paid to prevention. In fact, 
a 2016 report of the Belgian Court of Auditors ( Rekenhof ) revealed that in the 
preceding years, more than 80 per cent of all applications for a derogation with 
a view to deforestation were granted. 93 
 Th e latter fi ndings should come as no major surprise, given the relatively 
poorly developed substantive framework when it comes to assessing application 
for nature destruction. Furthermore, in the Flemish region, agencies and 
permitting authorities typically use the existing compensation schemes to say 
 “ yes ” to destructive logging proposals. 94 In other words, permitting forest loss 
remains the default option, which is further justifi ed by the presence of the 
forest off set scheme. Th e glaring lack of substantive criteria to be taken into 
account when balancing the preservation of forests against other interests 
certainly leads to a further death by discretion. 
 However, seeing that the application of the existing off setting schemes is 
far from perfect, as is demonstrated below ( infra ,  section  3.4 ), the refusal to 
give precedence to prevention additionally compromises the future of forests 
in Flanders. Th is is because many planning authorities are adamant when it 
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 95  See for instance:  Wende ,  supra , note 20 at p. 6;  M.  Curran et al. ,  Is there any empirical support 
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 97  See for a more extensive analysis:  H.  Schoukens ,  Proactive habitat restoration and the 
avoidance of adverse eff ects on protected areas: Development project review in Europe aft er 
Orleans ,  Journal of International Wildlife Law  & Policy  2017 , pp. 125 – 154. 
comes to prioritising economic developments over conservation considerations. 
If anything, off setting should never be the departure point when old-growth 
forests are threatened by project developments. Th e literature holds that while 
biodiversity loss might be acceptable in some cases, especially when it relates to 
non-endangered habitats or species, using off set schemes as a tool to encroach 
upon old-growth and vulnerable habitats only leads to further losses. 95 Th e 
political farce surrounding the adoption of a Forest Map ( Boskaart ) aimed at 
protecting additional forests, underscores the limited political will to reinforce 
the preventative approach, even for valuable old-growth forests, which are 
relatively diffi  cult to restore. 
 Again, countless examples can be given to further underpin the latter 
statements. Th e simple fact that in recent years a Flemish transport company, 
Essers, has received two permits for the deforestation of two forests  – one 
old-growth forest located in an industrial zone and one ecologically valuable 
forest located inside a Natura 2000 site  – poignantly illustrates the continued 
deference when it comes to reasserting the mitigation hierarchy against the 
backdrop of endangered forests. In both instances, reference was made to 
future forest compensation actions, alongside the urgent economic necessity to 
build on the site, as the principal argument to authorise the interventions. As 
is demonstrated further below, the Belgian Council of State ultimately quashed 
the permit for the deforestation located in a Natura 2000 site. However, as to the 
fi rst application, the deforestation still went ahead. Ironically, the site itself 
is currently being used as a parking lot, which sheds a diff erent light on the 
motivation that was added to the permit application. 96 Of course, these cases 
are to be treated as mere anecdotal evidence. Yet, seeing that in both instances 
there was massive public outcry and protest, they also indicate the persistent 
refusal to fully apply the preventative approach in the context of a valuable 
old-growth forest. 
 As such, such interim fi nds should not come as a major surprise. What is 
more, outside the context of forests, there exists a clear tendency to use off sets 
as a principal precursor of economic development, even in the context of 
protected  areas, such as Natura 2000 sites. Recently, though, both the CJEU 
and the Belgian Council of State have consistently rejected such more liberal 
approaches  to off setting. 97 Th e most notorious example was off ered by the 
 Orleans decision of the CJEU, which rejected an approach whereby nature 
restoration actions could  be used as a means to avoid the application of the 
Intersentia
Hendrik Schoukens and Geert Van Hoorick 
520
derogation schemes in the context of harbour expansion plans in Natura 
2000 sites. 98 A similar rationale urged the Belgian Council of State to reject 
forest compensatory measures to be used as mitigation within the context 
of an appropriate assessment needed for a road construction project in the 
province of Limburg with an impact on forests located in Natura 2000 sites. 99 
Instead of presenting forest off sets as a  “ licence to trash ” , recent case law 
developments  – at least in the context of protected forests  – seem to correct 
this fl awed compensation narrative. 
 However, unfortunately this approach has not led to a conclusive and 
meaningful shift  in the general permitting policies. In this context, compensation 
is oft en still treated as the easy route for permit approval, with only a limited 
number of applications being rejected. In late 2019, it was revealed that nearly 
all applications for deforestation that were fi led during 2018 were granted, which 
once again underlines the diffi  culty of saying  “ no ” and applying the mitigation 
hierarchy in a more rigid manner. 100 It also underlines that the permitting 
schemes  – aimed at legalising biodiversity losses  – are still seen as the primary 
objective of the application of environmental rules. At a very minimum, a 
delicate balancing exercise is to be carried out when logging ecologically 
valuable losses, and future off setting measures  – even when an application is 
made with very progressive compensation actions  – should never be treated as a 
general facilitator for unsustainable project development, especially taking into 
account the many fl aws inherent in the current Flemish compensation schemes 
that are identifi ed below ( see infra ,  section 3.4 ). 
 3.3.  THE LIMITED MATERIAL SCOPE OF THE COMPENSATION 
SCHEME: NOT ALL LOSSES ARE COMPENSATED 
 When relying upon a compensation scheme, it evidently remains crucial 
to ensure that its scope is suffi  ciently wide. However, as was already partly 
highlighted above, the material scope of the Flemish compensation schemes 
for forest loss does not fully encompass all actions liable to destroy forest 
habitats. Th is explains why 23  per  cent of the losses of forest cover are not 
compensated. Over a period of fi ve years (2014 – 2019), an area of 268 hectares 
of deforestation did not require additional compensation. Not all exemptions 
are detrimental against the backdrop of conservation interests, though. As 
explained above, the exemption for deforestation in the context of ecological 
restoration action is certainly sensible, provided that the decisions are always 
 98  CJEU, Case C-387/15, Orleans, ECLI:EU:C:2016:583, paras. 36 – 38. See also: CJEU, 
Case C-521/12, Briels, ECLI:EU:C:2014:330, paras. 28 – 35. 
 99  Belgian Council of State, case no. 223.083, 29 March 2013. 
 100  See more extensively:  Schoukens ,  supra , note 97. 
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(192), pp. 488 – 489. 
based upon sound science. It can safely be assumed that this is mostly the 
case, since the exemption is confi ned to instances in which the deforestation is 
mandatory in view of the applicable conservation targets for Natura 2000 sites. 
 However, the other exemption clauses are subject to greater criticism. For 
instance, it remains contested whether the deforestation of spontaneously 
aff orested woodlands that are less than 22 years old should not give rise to 
compensation duties. Along similar lines, one might also contest the exemption 
for social considerations, which explains why no off sets are required in habitation 
or housing zones whenever the purported deforestation does not surpass the 
threshold of 0.5 hectares. While one might submit that private property owners 
oft en might lack the necessary time and skills to opt for compensation in nature, 
this is not necessarily the case for the fi nancial or in lieu payments that equally 
remain eligible in such instances. As long as the scope of the compensation 
duty does not encompass these cases of deforestation, the risk of enduring or 
accumulated net losses remains a very likely option. Accordingly, additional 
scrutiny appears to be warranted when craft ing exemptions to a general 
compensation duty. 
 3.4.  FINANCIAL COMPENSATION AS THE DEFAULT OPTION: 
THE  “ POLLUTER PAYS ” PRINCIPLE ? 
 In general, three approaches to biodiversity off setting are currently present 
within the framework of conservation policies, namely permittee-led or  ad hoc 
payments to a compensation fund 101 ( “ in lieu fees ” ) and compensation through 
habitat banking. 102 None of these three approaches to biodiversity off setting is 
fl awless. For one, permittee-led compensations are oft en case specifi c and thus 
allow for a more precise (like-for-like) off setting of biodiversity losses. Yet since 
they are third-party-led, they are oft en characterised by a relatively high number 
of failures, due to the lack of expertise and the absence of long-term protection 
commitments, among other factors. 103 At the other end of the spectrum, it 
has been stated that conservation banks might lead to more comprehensive 
and eff ective nature biodiversity off sets. At the same time, such an approach is 
associated with a clear risk of the further commodifi cation of biodiversity. 104 
In addition, the existence of conservation banking requires suffi  cient regulatory 
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 106  Rekenhof ,  supra , note 48 at p. 46. 
 107  Id. at pp. 45 – 58. 
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Oikos  2016 , p.  17 . 
 109  Rekenhof ,  supra , note 48 at pp. 47 – 48. 
 110  Id. 
capacity, which might be particularly diffi  cult to achieve in times of budgetary 
restraint. 105 
 As could already be deduced from the analysis above, biodiversity off sets 
have primarily been implemented within the Flemish region through so-called 
permittee-led off setting schemes until the beginning of the 21st Century. Even 
so, within the context of the Forest Decree, a specifi c forest compensation 
fund ( boscompensatiefonds ) has been operational since 2002. As stated above, 
project developers are permitted to comply with their off setting obligations by 
transferring payments to a fund. Until 2014, in 78 per cent of all cases deforesters 
opted for compensation through payments to the compensation fund. In 2014, 
the Decree was modifi ed so that payments to the forest compensation fund are 
now only permissible if the deforestation does not concern more than three 
hectares. Th e money in the compensation fund is to be used to create easily 
accessible forests near cities, for urban nature and to achieve the conservation 
objectives of Natura 2000. 106 
 Be that as it may, the performance of the Flemish compensation fund 
is rather poor. As stated above, the Flemish region is still to be regarded as a 
 “ net deforester ” , which is partly caused by the many delays and obstacles that 
are encountered when attempting to make use of the money in the fund. 107 
Other studies also revealed that funds have been  “ piled up ” by the Agency for 
Nature and Forests but have not been used to purchase new lands in order to 
compensate for the deforested zones in a timely manner. 108 In 2016, this fi nding 
caused a major stir in the public debate, with the competent Minister being 
forced to explain why less money is spent than is reimbursed on a yearly basis 
in the fund. Moreover, it was disclosed that between the creation of the fund 
and 2014, approximately 637 hectares of land had been purchased in order to 
be aff orested over time. Since in total 2,340 hectares needed to be off set, the 
fund has therefore only been able to realise 27 per cent of the required off sets. 109 
Th e 2016 Report issued by the Belgian Court of Auditors concluded that 
as more than half of the available funds have already been used to purchase 
lands, the compensation fund is not likely to achieve its NNL objectives, 
let alone achieve future gains. 110 
 Th e reasons for this manifest underperformance of the compensation fund 
are manifold. For a considerable time, ensuring the timely implementation of 
the money that was collected through the fund did not appear to be a political 
top priority. Moreover, the monetary payments to the compensation fund were 
Intersentia 523
No Net Loss and Forest Off sets in the Flemish Region 
 111  Id. at pp. 50 – 51. 
 112  Anseeuw ,  supra , note 108 at p. 17. 
 113  Id . at p. 19. 
 114  See on this topic:  J.W.  Bull  &  S.  Brownlie ,  Th e transition from No Net Loss to a Net Gain of 
biodiversity is far from trivial ,  Oryx ,  2017 , pp. 53 – 59. 
 115  Ten Kate  & Pilgrim ,  supra , note 88 at pp. 19 – 20. 
 116  M. Maron et al. , Conservation: stop misuse of biodiversity off sets, Nature 2015 (523), 
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not framed as a  “ last resort option ” but rather the starting position, relieving the 
project developers from their primary responsibility of avoiding deforestation 
in the fi rst place. Factors such as the elevated price of land, the relatively 
high pressure on open space within the Flemish region and the additional 
budgetary checks that are included in the compensation fund scheme help 
to explain the current implementation failures. 111 Th ere is also an important 
imbalance between the price that had to be paid by a deforester to destroy 
one hectare of forest  – approximately  € 20,000  – and the fi nancial means 
required to purchase one hectare of land to serve as an off set zone  – on 
average  € 60,000. Th e current underpinnings of the forest compensation fund 
thus seem to underestimate the sums required to create eff ective biodiversity 
off sets for the authorised deforestations. 112 Th ese observations prompted the 
Flemish government in 2017 to increase the compensation fee, which is now 
set at  € 3.56 per hectare. Yet this represents only a modest step forward in view 
of the important challenges ahead. Even aft er the recent revision, it can be 
stated that the true cost of biodiversity off setting is not fully refl ected in the 
applicable compensation fees, which raises the question whether this is in line 
with the  “ polluter pays ” principle, which is still to be regarded as a core principle 
of EU environmental law. Needless to say, the latter fi ndings make a strong case 
for a stricter application of the preventative approach regarding forest off sets in 
the Flemish Region, which no longer presupposes that a substantive majority of 
all applications for deforestation are authorised. 113 
 3.5.  ADDITIONALITY, TIME GAPS AND INTERIM LOSSES: 
HOW CAN DEGRADING BASELINES BE AVOIDED ? 
 If one is aiming to achieve NNL or, in some instances, even net gains 114 through 
the use of biodiversity off setting, the key question is against which counterfactual 
baselines these losses or gains are to be measured. 115 Only biodiversity benefi ts 
that are additional to a baseline scenario count as valid off sets. 116 In this respect, 
to what extent the proposed biodiversity off sets are additional when measured 
against the existing nature conservation policies and competing sources of 
funding will need to be assessed. 117 
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 118  Belgian Council of State, case no. 238.181, 12 September 2017. 
 Ensuring additionality is evidently also crucial in the context of forest 
compensation. In this regard, four additional observations are in order when it 
comes to the Flemish practice of forest off setting. 
 First, it needs to be noted that no general baseline exists in the Flemish region 
against which the so-called additionality of forest off sets can be measured. 
Indeed, whereas a multitude of commitments and pledges exist when it comes to 
forest recovery, no operational baseline scenario is used in order to ensure that 
the compensation measures and actions go beyond the existing commitments 
and thus avoid so-called  “ double dipping ” . From a practical point of view, one 
might submit that every compensated forest is to be applauded. However, 
if the goal is to avoid degrading baselines or, alternatively, net gains, a more 
comprehensive approach is needed in this regard. As of today, however, the only 
context in which measurable baselines are present is Natura 2000. In this respect, 
another striking example of the importance of ambitious recovery baselines and 
targets was off ered by a recent ruling of the Belgian Council of State. Th e case 
revolved around the ecological impact of a road bypass ( Noordzuidverbinding ). 
When assessing the planning permit, the Council of State posited that if 
progressive restoration objectives are applicable to a Natura 2000 site, the loss of 
even 0.17 hectares of actual woodland habitats or, as the case may be, of potential 
habitats for bird species, is to be regarded as signifi cant in terms of Article 6(3) of 
the Habitats Directive. 118 Accordingly, Flemish judges are increasingly inclined 
to use the applicable conservation objectives as baseline when assessing the 
signifi cance of interventions in forests habitats that are designated as Natura 
2000 site. Outside the context of the stringent Natura 2000 legislation, such a 
rigid stance would probably have been very unlikely. Admittedly, the recent 
jurisprudential shift  could easily be dismissed as an example of regulatory 
creep. Yet such a stance would miss the very point about degrading baselines. 
Th e jurisprudence that has recently emerged does give proper weight to the 
restoration baseline that is to be implemented in the context of woodlands located 
inside Natura 2000 sites. It moreover appears pivotal to avoid further reference 
loss. Yet, once again, the importance of this case law is not to be overstated, 
seeing as many local municipalities do not bother to consult such jurisprudence. 
Even more so, these cases, in the context of which the Agency for Nature and 
Forests has oft en also consented to the destruction of woodlands, further 
underlines the current negligence at the level of the competent agencies when 
scrutinising the draft ed environmental reports. At best, they check whether no 
manifest errors are made. Regardless of the motivations underlying this refusal, 
recent administrative practices still highlight that many competent agencies 
grapple to understand the importance of avoiding baseline losses. Th is manifest 
mismatch needs to be addressed in the context of future legislative proposals, 
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the ship fairway of the river Main at the sections Wipfeld, Garstadt and Swcheinfurt (Bavaria, 
Germany), C(2013) 1871 fi nal, p. 4. 
 121  J.T.  Dale ,  Death by a Th ousand Cuts: Incorporating Cumulative Eff ects in Australia ’ s 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act ,  Pacifi c Rim Law and Policy 
 2011 , pp. 150 et seq. 
 122  For instance, pursuant to Annex IV(4)(e) of the EIA Directive, an EIA needs to assess  “ the 
accumulation of eff ects with other existing and/or approved projects, taking into account any 
with an additional focus on peer-reviewed data on the available forest cover in 
the Flemish region. Th e lack of such data remains an important obstacle for 
performing an off setting approach. 
 A second observation relates to the use of compensation ratios in the context 
of forest off sets, which is certainly to be welcomed against the backdrop of 
reference losses. As illustrated above, explicit compensation ratios apply in the 
context of forest off sets in the Flemish region. Th ey start from 1:1 at a minimum 
for mixed forests, comprised of 20 – 80 per cent native deciduous trees. Th is ratio 
increases to 1:3 if a woodland is removed that is important for achieving the 
conservation objectives in a Natura 2000 site. 119 While these progressive ratios 
appear impressive at fi rst sight, the available data underscore that they do not 
succeed in stemming ongoing losses, let alone achieve net gains in biodiversity. 
Taking into account the progressive compensation ratios that are sometimes 
used within the context of Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive, derogations in 
other countries (up to 1:7) 120 and the time lags to be faced when implementing 
woodland compensation zones, a reconsideration of these ratios should still be 
envisaged. 
 Th e so-called risk of  “ death by a thousand cuts ” should be singled out as a 
penultimate remark in the context of forest off setting. A recurring element when 
discussing and analysing the eff ectiveness of biodiversity off sets is the extent 
to which they are able to encompass diff use losses accumulated over time. In 
recent years, the  “ death by a thousand cuts ” syndrome has gained popularity 
in environmental discourse, especially when pointing to the accumulation of 
smaller, insignifi cant and diff use impacts, which is believed to be one of the 
greatest concerns for our remaining biodiversity. Indeed, the most damaging 
environmental eff ects oft en result not from the direct eff ects of a discrete 
action, but from the combination and accumulation of the individually minor 
eff ects of multiple actions over time (cumulative eff ects). 121 It is obvious that 
in highly urbanised and fragmented regions, such as the Flemish region, a 
particular focus on cumulative eff ects is instrumental to reversing the ongoing 
levels of fragmentation. Furthermore, EU environmental law places particular 
emphasis on the avoidance of cumulative eff ects, especially when caused 
by harmful project developments which are subject to a prior appropriate 
assessment and/or strategic environmental assessment (SEA) or EIA. 122 
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 124  Anseeuw ,  supra , note 108 at p. 17. 
 125  Van Gossum et al .,  supra , note 34 at pp. 518 and 519. 
Th e  recent reports regarding forest protection in Flanders have showcased 
cases of creeping deforestation, in which the accumulation of a sequence of 
small-scale intervention ultimately leads to signifi cant eff ects in the remaining 
woodlands. Th e case of the Forest of Kluisbergen ( Kluisbergen bos ) is revelatory. 
Once this woodland was a robust complex of forest habitats. Aft er decades of 
fragmentation,  the forest now harbours dozens of villas and can no longer be 
qualifi ed as a resilient woodland. 123 
 Another important observation relates to the location of the purported 
off set zones. In order to guarantee the additionality of the off sets in terms of 
ecological benefi ts, they are to be located in sites which are closely connected 
with other core nature areas. In recent times, the majority of in lieu payments 
that were collected in the compensation fund have been used to create large-scale 
woodlands and forests close to medium-sized cities. However, additional rules 
are instrumental to ensure that the implementation of off sets is further aligned 
with global recovery strategies. An additional caution is warranted in view of 
the continued loss of open space  – at a pace of six hectares every year  – in a 
highly urbanised area such as Flanders. As noted above, the off set actions need 
to be carried out in certain green and public areas in the applicable zoning 
plans. As such, this appears to make sense. However, in order to eff ectively 
augment the amount of biodiversity, priority should be given to aff orestation 
in  “ grey areas ” instead of focusing on the few remaining open spaces in the 
Flemish region. 124 Even so, following this line of argument, agricultural areas 
would remain bereft  of additional biodiversity. Taking into account the limited 
ecological performance of current agricultural practices, which primarily focus 
on short-term profi ts, creating room for additional woodlands in agricultural 
lands should not be completely ruled out as a sensible future policy direction. 
Th at said, in order to aff orest agricultural land other pieces of legislation also 
need to be observed, which  – at present  – eff ectively function as additional 
obstacles for swift  compensation. For instance, pursuant to Article 35bis(5) of 
the Federal Field Code, aff oresting agricultural lands has been made subject to prior 
authorisation by local municipalities, which opens up room for local politicians 
to hinder aff orestation. Moreover, consistent eff orts to review the Tenure Law, so 
as to explicitly authorise the termination of tenure by the landowner for reasons 
of aff orestation, have been consistently rejected by the political majority in the 
federal parliament. 125 
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 3.6.  FALTERING ENFORCEMENT: WHO IS CONTROLLING 
THE ENFORCER AND AVOIDS FURTHER ABUSES ? 
 An fi nal element to be considered is the lack of the proper enforcement of 
off set actions. Th is is a well-known defi ciency of many biodiversity off sets. 126 
Against the backdrop of the persistent doubts concerning the eff ectiveness of 
off sets, especially in the context of old-growth habitats 127 and the recurring 
implementation defi cits, strict monitoring and enforcement are key features 
of any eff ective NNL policy. In theory, strict monitoring requirements in the 
context of biodiversity off sets should already have been operational within the 
Flemish region, given the existing obligations imposed by the Habitats Directive 
on the one hand and the recently amended EIA Directive on the other hand. 128 
However, it is not surprising to note that an important enforcement gap exists, 
as was also noted in the 2016 Report of the Belgian Court of Auditors. 129 
 It is important to note that the current legislation puts forward certain 
requirements in respect of the further implementation of the off set actions, as 
was detailed above. Th e forest compensation  in natura has to be carried out 
within  two years. Th is can either be realised on land owned by the project 
developer or that of some third party. If the off sets are not implemented 
in a timely manner, the permit holder will be liable for criminal sanctions. 
Non-compliance with permit conditions is to be treated as an environmental 
criminal off ence. Last but not least, the off set site must be maintained as forest 
for a minimum of 25 years. 130 In other words, there is no explicit requirement as 
such to conserve and manage the newly created forests until maturity. 
 In addition, there is also a large gap between theory and practice. Of 
course, the failure to eff ectively enforce nature conservation legislation is a 
well-known fact of life even when certain actions might constitute a criminal 
off ence. Nature inspection has been granted a limited budget, which entails 
that on-site inspections are the exception rather than the rule. Th is fi nding also 
perfectly ties in with outcomes of the 2016 REFIT fi tness check of the EU Nature 
Directives. 131 Th e fact that poor enforcement was also prone to aff ect strictly 
protected woodlands that were included in Natura 2000 sites still represented a 
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major wake-up call in the Flemish context. Yet this is precisely what happened in 
what is to be regarded as one of the most mediatised nature conservation cases 
in the Flemish region of recent decades. Indeed, one of the most noteworthy 
illustrations of the poor enforcement of biodiversity off sets within the Flemish 
region was off ered by the recent controversy surrounding the second expansion 
of a transport company (Essers) in a designated Natura 2000 site. In 2009, 
the Belgian company had been authorised to conduct a fi rst extension of an 
industrial estate within an adjacent Natura 2000 site, which would lead to the 
destruction of 1.7 hectares of woodland habitats. Yet this was permitted on the 
condition that an adjacent zone of 10 hectares bordering the extended industrial 
site was to be developed as a more resilient and ecologically valuable woodland 
and heather restoration zone. In addition, the planning permit stipulated that 
this expansion had to be the fi nal one, since the adjacent Natura 2000 site was 
already subject to an unfavourable conservation status and further fragmentation 
would compromise the already degraded baseline. 132 Nevertheless, the bulk of 
the restoration measures, which, moreover, were not framed as compensation 
within the context of Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive, were not properly 
implemented. No trees were planted, nor was the heather restoration plan 
ever initiated. 133 In spite of the manifest non-observance of the compensation 
duties included in the permit conditions, the competent authorities declined 
to institute criminal proceedings against the permit holder. Most remarkably, 
the implementation defi cit was subsequently used as an implicit argument to 
authorise a second expansion of the undertaking by another 10 hectares, precisely 
in the area (the  “ compensation zone ” ) which ought to have been restored to a 
birch and oak woodland pursuant to the previous planning permit. 
 When fi nally authorising the second expansion in 2016, the Flemish 
government maintained that the expansion zone contained no actual habitat 
features and in view of the conservation objectives that had been adopted in the 
meantime, its further restoration was no longer deemed relevant. 134 However, 
no explicit attention has been paid to the cumulative eff ects arising from the new 
degradation and the non-compliance with the previous off set commitments. 
EU environmental law contains a clear-cut duty to remedy infringements 
of EU law. 135 Member States are moreover in principle barred from deriving 
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advantages from their own non-compliance with their protection duties under 
Article 6(2) and (3) of the Habitats Directive. 136 At a very minimum, the second 
expansion of the industrial site should have been subject to the application of 
the derogation procedure given the cumulative amount of habitat loss  – which 
amounted to no less than 15 hectares in total over a 10-year period  – that was 
validated through the successive authorisation procedures. 137 
 It is obvious that this one case cannot be deemed indicative of the apparent 
defi ciencies of the entire enforcement policy with respect to biodiversity 
off sets. Even so, the case clearly resonated in wider Flemish society, even before 
the fi nal decision had been taken on the second expansion. 138 Against the 
backdrop of the ensuing public debate and the recent case law developments 
before the CJEU regarding Article  6(2) of the Habitats Directive, which is to 
be regarded as a generally applicable and enforceable non-regression clause, 139 
one might at least have expected the Flemish region to act in a more reluctant 
manner and explicitly reassess the previous non-compliance elements. However, 
instead of reinforcing the earlier compensation commitments  – which had a 
binding nature  – the Flemish government showed remarkable leniency towards 
the project developer. Time and money were spent to argue that new off sets 
were to replace the forest to be destroyed, whereas no further attention was 
paid to the existing commitments. Accordingly, the case can rightly be quoted 
as yet another illustration of the lack of proper enforcement of mitigation and 
compensation duties. 
 Ultimately the Belgian Council of State decided to quash the planning 
decisions and permits for their failure to abide the conservation duties set out by 
Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive in two decisions, one in 2017 and another 
one in 2018. 140 Yet, rather ironically, the transport company recently reached a 
deal with one of the NGOs that had initiated legal proceedings (Natuurpunt vzw) 
on the development of another site. Despite the new location of the expansion 
no longer being situated in Natura 2000 sites, it will still lead to the deforestation 
of an  “ out-zoned ” forest. 141 Th is is simply another illustration of how nature is 
always on the losing side, even aft er having won in courtroom. Similarly it also 
exposes the ambivalent position in which environmental NGOs fi nd themselves. 
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Understandably, these groups do not want to be perceived as  “ zealots ” as Wood 
puts it, 142 which explains their willingness to broker deals even when  – in this 
case less valuable  – nature will be destroyed. 
 Be that as it may, the outcome of the latter case is exceptional to the extent 
that it saw an environmental NGO successfully enforcing earlier compensation 
commitments. Yet it merely represents the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Th e 2016 
Report of the Belgian Court of Auditors revealed that a positive outcome of 
the compensation actions is only realised in 68 per cent of the cases in which 
project-led compensation is applied. 143 Additional manpower will be needed 
in order to enable the proper monitoring of all the existing compensation 
pledges. 
 4. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK 
 If this analysis of the Flemish approach to NNL has made one thing clear, it is 
that biodiversity off sets are not to be presented as a panacea for all ills. Although 
biodiversity off setting is oft en repeated ad nauseam among entrepreneurs 
and policy makers, a wide-spread application of biodiversity off setting tools 
is certainly not innocent, especially given the poor outcome of restoration 
measures in the context of NNL approaches so far. It should therefore not be 
used as a recurrent replacement for stricter preservation eff orts, especially since 
it is prone to be misused by permit issuing authorities with a pro-development 
bias. Against this backdrop, biodiversity off setting is increasingly to be identifi ed 
as both the cause and symptom of the current failures of the existing nature 
conservation laws. 144 Th is is no diff erent in the Flemish region. Of course, 
one might submit that the plight of the woodlands in Flanders should not be 
overstated, seeing that the largest deforestation takes place in the interests of 
nature recovery, namely in view of the implementation and realisation of the 
site-specifi c conservation objectives. In comparison with the forest losses 
elsewhere in the world, especially in the Amazon and Congo basins, the 
continued net loss of forest cover in the Flemish region might seem trivial. In 
addition, in other surrounding countries, forest cover has also been shrinking 
in recent years. More importantly, though, the reasons explaining the continued 
failure to reverse the negative trend in terms of forest cover in the Flemish 
region are universal. Ultimately, the loss of forest cover is but one indication 
Intersentia 531
No Net Loss and Forest Off sets in the Flemish Region 
 145  See in this regard:  Wood ,  supra , note 94 at pp. 188 – 207. 
 146  For a concise analysis of the latest proposals, see: Vlaamse Regering heft  nieuwe regeling 
klaar voor bescherming kwetsbare bossen, Knack, 14 December 2018,  https://www.knack.be/
nieuws/belgie/vlaamse-regering-heeft -nieuwe-regeling-klaar-voor-bescherming-kwetsbare-
bossen/article-belga-1406807.html . 
of a wider trend, i.e. the ongoing decline of natural elements within the 
Flemish region. 
 Th is legal analysis of the Flemish forest off setting regime serves as a 
cautionary tale for the many legal, policy-related and societal hurdles to be 
overcome when implementing compensation policies at the national level. 
Although the patchwork of diff erent protection and off setting schemes in the 
Flemish legislation appears impressive at fi rst glance, its concrete application and 
enforcement fall short in view of the level of ambition set by the EU biodiversity 
strategy to 2020. At best, some compelling cases have recently emerged in which 
proactive off setting strategies have been tested. Even so, the failure to take 
into account the social implications of these actions, combined with a blatant 
disregard for the mitigation hierarchy, ultimately led to their eventual demise 
aft er legal courtroom action. 
 In order to stop continued degradation and forest loss and, if possible, to 
achieve net gains of biodiversity, a shift  towards a stricter authorisation policy 
will be inevitable, even if this would clash with the prevailing attitude towards 
green growth (which assumes that ecological restoration can be reconciled 
with continued economic development). Moreover, agencies and authorities 
will need to move beyond deference and discretion and take up their role as 
genuine trustees of common goods, such as woodlands. 145 Th is might sound 
simplistic, yet it should certainly not be treated as a truism. Th e legislation 
needs to clearly stipulate the substantive yardsticks to be taken into account 
when considering biodiversity off sets, with a clear observance of the mitigation 
hierarchy. Only if applied in such a strict context, with the provision of 
additional monitoring, biodiversity off sets might eventually stall the ongoing 
loss and create net gains. Th e usage of conservation banking, especially when 
applied within the context of the loss of  “ ordinary ” biodiversity, might lead to 
less interim losses seeing that the available credits represent additional nature 
or woodlands that have already materialised on the ground. 
 However, given that there has also been a recent eff ort to strengthen the 
authorisation scheme for ecologically valuable woodlands that are located 
outside the designated green areas on the applicable zoning plans that failed 
to get adopted, little hope exists that we might soon witness a shift  towards 
more coherent and cohesive biodiversity off setting in Flanders. 146 Ironically, 
one of the main reasons the new draft  proposal for the enhanced protection of 
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out-zoned forest was not adopted in 2019 was linked to the fact that it might 
need a prior SEA in order to get the go-ahead. While this could easily be 
framed as yet another example of administrative overkill, it might still help the 
authorities to set the scientifi c data straight before moving forward with new 
protection schemes. Such a scenario is to be preferred over rushing the adoption 
of another imperfect map of  “ out-zoned ” forest, paving the way for additional 
legal challenges. 
 Beyond the specifi c Flemish context, this analysis puts forward the following 
general lessons in this regard. 
 First, there exists a clear need for a proactive integration of biodiversity 
conservation interests in the existing land-use planning schemes. Th e lack of 
the timely integration of off setting policies in strategic planning frameworks 
explains the signifi cant time lags that occur when implementing forest 
compensations. A more strategic approach to off setting might eventually lead to 
robust nature core areas, where the recovery targets are more easily met and their 
implementation is faced with less delay. Instead of being  ad hoc and reactive, 
a more timely integration allows off sets to be proactive and resilient. 
 Second, the so-called mitigation hierarchy should be properly refl ected within 
the existing regulatory framework regarding biodiversity off sets, while suffi  cient 
attention needs to be paid to the topic of cumulative eff ects. Th e absence of this 
might lead to a situation in which exemptions are too easily granted by local 
municipalities and regional agencies, as has been the case in Flanders during 
recent decades. While one might provide additional leverage for biodiversity 
off setting in the context of  “ ordinary ” nature, it should never be treated as the 
default option. 
 Th ird, off setting policies need to be based upon comprehensive ecological 
science, which requires a government to hold that some valuable woodlands are 
irreplaceable and thus non-off setable. Sound monitoring programmes should 
ensure that off sets do not exacerbate ongoing losses. In order to facilitate the 
introduction of stricter protection regimes, suffi  cient attention should be paid 
to sound scientifi c underpinnings. 
 Fourth, the compensation ratios used need to be suffi  ciently ambitious to 
attain the applicable NNL (or even net-gains) rationale. Th e topic of collateral 
losses ( “ death by a thousand cuts ” ) needs to be taken into consideration in this 
regard. While payments to a compensation fund and/or conservation banks 
might be recommended in some instances, one at least needs to ensure that such 
fees refl ect the true cost of aff oresting new lands. If not, off setting policies will 
merely lead to more biodiversity losses, as was illustrated by the Flemish case 
study. 
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 Fift h, the impact of future forest protection rules on vested property rights 
is to be fully acknowledged. Financial compensation schemes need to be put 
into place for the aff ected landowners, which will eventually also diminish 
the societal resistance to a more stringent protection of forests, even when 
located in previously designated housing zones. It is crucial that such fi nancial 
compensation schemes are easily accessible and provide a short-term solution to 
the property value loss resulting from tighter protection rules. 

